

**MINE ACTION REVIEW**

# **CLEARING THE MINES 2017**

*A REPORT BY MINE ACTION REVIEW FOR THE SIXTEENTH MEETING OF  
STATES PARTIES TO THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION*

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December 2017



**Norwegian People's Aid**



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## Acknowledgements

This report was researched and written by Nick Cumming-Bruce, Katherine Harrison, Lucy Pinches, and Stuart Casey-Maslen. Mine Action Review is project-managed by Lucy Pinches. The report was edited by Stuart Casey-Maslen and laid out by Optima Design in the United Kingdom. The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) are on the project's Advisory Board. Mine Action Review would like to thank the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for funding its work as well as all those who contributed data and information.

## Other information

The publication is available for download at [www.mineactionreview.org](http://www.mineactionreview.org)

Mine Action Review conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on anti-personnel landmine survey and clearance, and shared all its country reports (excluding the sections on programme performance, performance commentary, and recommendations for action) with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC)'s Landmine Monitor.

Please send any comments to [feedback@mineactionreview.org](mailto:feedback@mineactionreview.org)

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## FOREWORD BY THE HALO TRUST, MAG, AND NPA

It is now 20 years since the adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, a landmark in conventional disarmament. The achievements of the Convention, especially the actions undertaken in furtherance of its Article 5, are astonishing. Collectively, since the 18th of September 1997, states parties and others have cleared more than 2,500km<sup>2</sup> of mined area and destroyed well over 4.3 million emplaced anti-personnel mines.

Countless lives have been saved as a direct consequence of mine action, and it is hard to exaggerate demining's broader contribution to development. Precious few, if any, instruments of international law can lay claim to such a far-reaching impact. In the last 12 months Algeria has become the 28th state party to meet its Article 5 clearance obligations: we congratulate them on their achievement, which was a clear demonstration of national ownership and funding.

The global clearance effort could not have been achieved without the mobilisation of much of the international community. It was civil society that first called for effective international action to tackle the epidemic of mine injuries in the early 1990s. Many states responded positively to the challenge by negotiating and joining the Convention and steadfastly supporting its implementation. With their help, in addition to valuable financial contributions from some states not party to the Convention, we are proud to have played our part in this success story of human endeavour. But the success stories are also individual ones. Above all, we pay tribute to the dedication and skill of women and men who have worked to clear mines in 90 affected countries. Some have paid the ultimate price for their courage.

But while we celebrate progress and honour bravery, we are ever mindful that in many instances even greater headway could and should have been made. In the late 1990s, and even (albeit to a lesser extent) thereafter, millions of dollars given over to mine action have not been used effectively. Poor surveys have inflated the true problem in many countries rather than identifying and localising it. Far too many areas that were free of contamination have been painstakingly cleared, while lives and limbs were being risked and even lost nearby. Through constructive dialogue, challenging ourselves and each other, improvements and progress have been, and continue to be made. Evidence-based survey is at the heart of efficient land release. Where needed, re-survey should be embraced, supported by good information management and strong national ownership.

As a sector, the mine action community has learnt from its mistakes and in a changing environment it must continue to do so. For today, in addition to the work clearing minefields laid years ago, we are increasingly confronted with the emplacement of new mines, particularly in Iraq, Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine, including many locally produced mines which are often unhelpfully referred to as IEDs. What is more, ongoing conflicts are preventing, or at least impeding, safe humanitarian access to some mined areas.


What we must not do as a global mine action community is to misrepresent the nature and scope of the new contamination, or to politicise it. Locally produced, victim-activated munitions are landmines wherever they are found, whether that it is Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Syria, or elsewhere. It does not matter how these weapons were produced or employed, nor by whom they were laid. So whenever a munition falls within the definition in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, it is an anti-personnel mine that must be cleared as soon as possible and reported on in accordance with the Convention's requirements.

Our work as a mine action community must always be both rigorous and systematic, fully respecting the tenets of international law. The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board should accelerate its work to ensure that the IMAS clearly encompass locally produced munitions, and also reflect the new, and often complex, realities of humanitarian demining today. Donors should do their part and insist that states and operators who receive their funding respect international law and consistently report locally produced, victim-activated munitions, as landmines, and not solely under the catch-all term "improvised explosive devices". We must work together to reduce, not exacerbate, confusion.

We would like to thank the Mine Action Review for its work and especially to thank national authorities for their commitment to transparency that has enabled the Review team to produce this report. We believe it can continue to be an effective tool to focus our collective efforts and partnerships. So let us, together, commit to redoubling our efforts. As this year's report reveals, we are fast approaching the moment of truth. Mine Action Review estimates that less than 2,000km<sup>2</sup> of land containing anti-personnel mines remains across the world. A landmine-free world by 2025, as called for in the Maputo +15 Declaration, will only come within our grasp if good practice in land release is applied in every contaminated country.

We must work hard to maintain the profile of mine action in both humanitarian and developmental settings, putting mine survey and clearance at the heart of peace agreements and ceasefires, and supporting the development of effective national coordination bodies. Of course, the funding and support of the international donor community and political will from all states also continue to be critical. For if people are left to confront the danger of anti-personnel mines on their own this is because the international community has chosen to do so. There is nothing inevitable about a landmine explosion.

As humanitarian demining organisations we pledge that we will continue to clear mines wherever we can: in safety, to the highest standards, and with the greatest speed. Twenty years after the adoption of Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, we remain, as the Convention declares in its very first words, *Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines.*



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**JANE COCKING**  
Chief Executive  
Mines Advisory Group



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**STEINAR ESSEN**  
Head  
Department for Humanitarian Disarmament  
Norwegian People's Aid



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**JAMES COWAN CBE DSO**  
Chief Executive Officer  
The HALO Trust



**Norwegian People's Aid**



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# OVERVIEW

## SUMMARY

A total of 59 states and 3 territories are believed to be still contaminated with anti-personnel mines. Mine Action Review estimates that less than 2,000km<sup>2</sup> of land is actually mined and must be cleared. Algeria completed mine clearance in December 2016, the most heavily mined state to do so since the entry into force of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), and Mozambique successfully cleared legacy landmine contamination that was discovered in 2015 following an earlier declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations. In addition, Mauritania was on course to complete clearance in early 2018. But new use of locally produced anti-personnel mines, especially those made and laid by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, is adding extensive landmine contamination for the first time in more than a decade.

Recorded global mine clearance in 2016 remained roughly stable compared with the previous year at almost 172km<sup>2</sup> (although these annual figures were nearly 15% lower than clearance achieved in 2014), with the destruction of more than 232,500 anti-personnel mines and over 21,000 anti-vehicle mines. Nonetheless, output for 2016 does not include very significant clearance by China on its border with Vietnam, possibly as high as 20km<sup>2</sup>, as Mine Action Review has been unable to confirm the details. It had been expected that Ecuador would meet its end-2017 Article 5 deadline for clearance. Not only did it fail to do so, it requested a five-year extension that calls into question its commitment to comply with its obligation under international law to complete clearance "as soon as possible". Other states that submitted requests for deadline extensions in 2017 were Angola, Iraq, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was one of the relatively few states that improved its mine action programme performance significantly in 2016.

Among other affected states parties, only Chile, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mauritania were expected to comply with their respective Article 5 deadlines for survey and clearance without the need to seek further extensions. In 2016, Niger and Peru sought and were granted overly long additional periods of extension. They should be in a position to complete clearance far in advance of these new deadlines. Ukraine has still to seek a deadline extension as a result of new use of anti-personnel mines since conflict erupted in 2014 and remains in serious violation of the Convention. Cameroon and Nigeria, whose Article 5 deadlines expired several years ago, are affected by locally produced mines emplaced by Boko Haram insurgents in the past two years. Neither state has submitted its respective annual transparency report declaring this new contamination as Article 7 of the APMBC requires, much less requested a new Article 5 deadline. Following several years of non-compliance, Jordan similarly needs to seek a new legal deadline at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in Vienna to ensure it returns to a state of compliance with Article 5.

The 2025 target for clearance set by the APMBC's Third Review Conference in 2014 is proving challenging, even for several states parties that are not engaged in armed conflict. In 2018, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, Sudan, and the United Kingdom are all expected to request a further extension to their respective Article 5 deadlines. Overall, improvements in mine action programmes are still patchy, with inadequate land release methodologies still plaguing too many programmes and too many operators. Many states parties have still to meet their legal obligations under Article 5 of the APMBC; a small number are even in violation. But the situation is assuredly not beyond remedy: if we work in partnership, apply best practice in land release, and are backed by sustained national and international funding through to completion, a landmine-free 2025 is still possible.

## GLOBAL CONTAMINATION

As at September 2017, 35 states parties to the APMBC were confirmed or strongly suspected to contain anti-personnel mines, along with 24 states not party and 3 other areas (see Table 1). As discussed below, this is a reduction of two states over the past 12 months following the completion of mine clearance by Algeria in December 2016 as well as by Mozambique (apart from a very small extent of suspected mined area that is persistently underwater).

In some states already known to be heavily mined, notably Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, ongoing armed conflicts have added new contamination. Myanmar and Ukraine are both believed to have emplaced new anti-personnel mines. In Myanmar's case, this is a violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. In Ukraine's case this is also a serious violation of its APMBC obligations "never under any circumstances" to use anti-personnel mines. There were also unconfirmed reports of new contamination from locally produced mines in Mali and Tunisia in 2016.

**Table 1: Global anti-personnel mine contamination (as at September 2017)**

States parties	States parties	States not party	States not party
Afghanistan	Niger	Armenia	Russia
Angola	Nigeria	Azerbaijan	South Korea
Argentina*	Oman	China	Sri Lanka
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Palau**	Cuba	Syria
Cambodia	Peru	Egypt	Uzbekistan
Cameroon	Senegal	Georgia	Vietnam
Chad	Serbia	India	<b>24 states not party</b>
Chile	Somalia	Iran	
Colombia	South Sudan	Israel	
Croatia	Sudan	Kyrgyzstan	
Cyprus	Tajikistan	Lao PDR	
DR Congo	Thailand	Lebanon	
Ecuador	Turkey	Libya	
Eritrea	Ukraine	Morocco	
Ethiopia	United Kingdom	Myanmar	<b>Other areas</b>
Iraq	Yemen	North Korea	Kosovo
Jordan	Zimbabwe	Pakistan	Nagorno-Karabakh
Mauritania		Palestine	Western Sahara
	<b>35 states parties</b>		<b>3 other areas</b>

\* Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The United Kingdom also claims sovereignty over the Islands and exercises control over them.

\*\* Palau may be able to declare fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations once necessary assessment and survey has been performed.

The total of 59 states and three other areas confirmed or strongly suspected to be mine-contaminated marks a welcome return to a longstanding downward trend in global contamination. As noted previously, Algeria completed mine clearance in 2016. In Mozambique, contamination that was not known when it declared completion of clearance was addressed early in 2017. Mozambique has undertaken to assess, as soon it is possible to do so, a small area of land, persistently underwater, where anti-personnel mines are suspected to remain.

## EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION

In many affected states, contamination is relatively modest, and full clearance is achievable within months or a few years with the necessary approach and commitment. Table 2 summarises what is known or reasonably believed about the extent of mine contamination in affected states and other areas. It is therefore an assessment by Mine Action Review based on available evidence, as opposed to the claims of governments or mine action programmes.

**Table 2: Extent of contamination in affected states and other areas (as at September 2017)\***

Massive (>100km <sup>2</sup> )	Heavy (>20km <sup>2</sup> )	Medium (2–20km <sup>2</sup> )	Light (<2km <sup>2</sup> ) or unclear
<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>Angola</b>	<b>Argentina**</b>	<b>Cameroon</b>
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	Azerbaijan	Armenia	<b>DR Congo</b>
<b>Cambodia</b>	<b>Chad</b>	<b>Colombia</b>	<b>Ecuador</b>
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Croatia</b>	<b>Chile</b>	India
	<b>Ethiopia</b>	China	Kyrgyzstan
	Iran	Cuba	<b>Mauritania</b>
	Israel	<b>Cyprus</b>	<b>Niger</b>
	Morocco	Egypt	<b>Nigeria</b>
	Myanmar	<b>Eritrea</b>	<b>Oman</b>
	North Korea	Georgia	<b>Palau</b>
	Russia	<b>Jordan</b>	Palestine
	<b>South Sudan</b>	Kosovo	<b>Peru</b>
	Sri Lanka	Lao PDR	<b>Senegal</b>
	Syria	Lebanon	<b>Serbia</b>
	<b>Thailand</b>	Libya	Uzbekistan
	<b>Turkey</b>	Nagorno-Karabakh	
	Western Sahara	Pakistan	
	<b>Zimbabwe</b>	<b>Somalia</b>	
		South Korea	
		<b>Sudan</b>	
		<b>Tajikistan</b>	
		<b>Ukraine</b>	
		<b>United Kingdom**</b>	
		Vietnam	
		<b>Yemen</b>	
<b>4 states</b>	<b>17 states and 1 other area</b>	<b>23 states and 2 other areas</b>	<b>15 states</b>

\* States parties to the APMBBC are in bold.

\*\* Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The United Kingdom also claims sovereignty over the Islands and exercises control over them.



## Locally produced mines

A very significant and growing problem from the use of locally produced mines (also called improvised or artisanal mines) has occurred over the last two years, especially those produced and emplaced by Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria. Loosely termed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by some, despite their status under international law,<sup>1</sup> these mines pose a major threat to civilians as well as to soldiers. Where the mines are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and will have the effect of injuring or killing, they fall within the APMBC definition and are prohibited by the treaty.<sup>2</sup> This is believed to be the case with the overwhelming majority of locally produced mines. It does not matter how these weapons were produced or employed for the purposes of the APMBC; if they fall within the definition of an anti-personnel mine and are used in areas under the jurisdiction or control of a state party, all the Convention's provisions apply, including the obligations to clear and report under Articles 5 and 7, respectively, just as they do to more conventionally produced anti-personnel mines.

## Completed clearance

A total of 29 states and 1 other area are no longer suspected to be contaminated with mines since the APMBC was adopted in 1997. All but Nepal (a state not party) and Taiwan (other area) are states parties to the APMBC.

**Table 3: Completion of landmine survey and clearance since 1997\***

State	State	State
<b>Albania</b>	<b>Germany</b>	Nepal
<b>Algeria</b>	<b>Greece</b>	<b>Nicaragua</b>
<b>Bhutan</b>	<b>Guatemala</b>	<b>Rwanda</b>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	<b>Suriname</b>
<b>Burundi</b>	<b>Honduras</b>	<b>Swaziland</b>
<b>Rep. of Congo</b>	<b>Hungary</b>	Taiwan
<b>Costa Rica</b>	<b>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</b>	<b>Tunisia</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	<b>Malawi</b>	<b>Uganda</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>Montenegro</b>	<b>Venezuela</b>
<b>The Gambia</b>	<b>Mozambique**</b>	<b>Zambia</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>29 states and 1 other area</b>

\* States parties to the APMBC are in bold.

\*\* Mozambique has four suspected mined areas that are underwater. These areas, which were declared by Mozambique to the other APMBC states parties, must be released as soon as it is possible to do so.

## CLEARANCE IN 2016 AND NEW CLEARANCE CHALLENGES

In 2016, a total of almost 172km<sup>2</sup> of mined area was cleared with the destruction of more than 232,500 anti-personnel mines and over 21,000 anti-vehicle mines. This is roughly the same figure for recorded global clearance output in 2015, though that year saw destruction of only some 156,000 anti-personnel mines and 13,500 anti-vehicle mines. Table 4 summarises the outputs of major mine clearance operations in 2016, with a comparison to the previous year. More than 95% of all recorded clearance in 2016 was by states parties to the APMBC (overleaf).

**Table 4: Global recorded anti-personnel mine clearance in 2016\***

State/area*	Area cleared (km <sup>2</sup> )	AP mines destroyed	Comparison to 2015 clearance (km <sup>2</sup> )
<b>Afghanistan</b>	49.2	19,114	+ 13.8
<b>Croatia</b>	38.7	1,380	- 1.9
<b>Cambodia</b>	26.7	7,578	- 19.8
<b>Iraq</b>	16.4	17,113	+ 11.2
<b>Algeria</b>	12.0**	62,589	- 0.8
<b>Chile</b>	3.5	N/R	+ 1.6
<b>Turkey</b>	3.4	9,422	+ 3.4
<b>Yemen</b>	3.0	16,440	+ 3.0
<b>South Sudan</b>	2.6	585	- 2.4
Sri Lanka	2.3	59,304	- 1.2
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	1.7	23,193	+ 1.0
<b>Jordan</b>	1.4	100	+ 0.75
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	1.3	1,313	- 0.3
<b>Angola</b>	1.2	1,350	- 2.9
<b>Somalia</b>	1.1	121	- 2.2
<b>Sudan</b>	1.0	105	+ 0.6
Israel	0.9	4,313	+ 0.2
Azerbaijan***	0.8	17	- 0.7
<b>Thailand***</b>	0.4	1,231	- 1.6
<i>Other programmes combined</i>	4.2	7,430	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>171.8</b>	<b>232,698</b>	

AP = Anti-personnel            N/R = Not recorded

\* APMBC states parties are in bold and clearance figures are rounded to the nearest decimal point.

\*\* Estimated by Mine Action Review. Algeria has reported clearance of some 28km<sup>2</sup> though it has not been possible to verify the details of this clearance.

\*\*\* These states are included as their clearance in 2015 was considerably greater than 1km<sup>2</sup> even though in both cases clearance output in 2016 dropped significantly, falling to below 1km<sup>2</sup>.

Afghanistan increased clearance by more than one third in 2016 compared to the previous year, after a huge drop in output in 2015. Iraq, even on the basis of partial data, more than tripled its clearance, the result of increased capacity and the use of mechanical assets for both technical survey and clearance by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in the north, and clearance by BACTEC of mined areas north-east of Basrah along the border with Iran for oilfield development, the only major mine clearance in the centre and south of the country.

In other positive news, Turkey, for the first time since becoming a state party to the APMBC in 2004, conducted significant mine clearance, achieving output of more than 3km<sup>2</sup>, most along its border with Syria to enable construction of a wall. Despite the conflict, Yemen also reported 3km<sup>2</sup> of clearance for the year. Seemingly, however, clearance in Cambodia saw another sharp drop in output in 2016, perhaps of more than 40%, after a similar decrease in 2015 compared to the year before. It may, though, be the case that as much as 4km<sup>2</sup> of clearance by the Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in 2016 was not recorded in the national authority's reporting due to delays in entering the data onto the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

As noted above, the global clearance total does not include reported clearance of some 20km<sup>2</sup> by China along its border with Vietnam as it has not been possible to verify the details. Further significant clearance may also have occurred in Iran, Russia, and Syria.

New anti-personnel mine contamination, and the heightened misery these indiscriminate weapons wreak before risk education can be effective and before clearance can remove the threat, give rise to many challenges. As the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) remind us, landmines are “first and foremost a humanitarian concern and should be addressed from the humanitarian perspective. In this regard, the framing of standards and their application to national mine action programmes and local projects should reflect the fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, equality and humanity so that mine action is focused on giving support to those who are most vulnerable.”<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, in areas where hostilities are ongoing, clearance of mines (and other munitions, including those of improvised nature) may compromise organisational neutrality and may amount to direct participation in hostilities, depriving deminers of their protection as civilians under applicable rules of international humanitarian law. There is particular concern within the humanitarian demining community that the clearance activities of some companies operating under the activities framework of “mine action” are being undertaken in circumstances, and in a way, that may offer direct benefit to one party to an armed conflict to the detriment of another.<sup>4</sup> Such acts could put at risk not only the lives of these deminers but also potentially the safety of all demining and other humanitarian personnel. They also infringe the 2009 Montreux Document in which participating states commit to assess whether services by private military and security companies (PMSCs) could cause PMSC personnel to become involved in direct participation in hostilities.<sup>5</sup>

It is important, therefore, that the mine action community continues to evolve to meet the priorities and challenges that are being faced while respecting international humanitarian law and the principles, values, and guiding frameworks that underpin both the law and mine action.

## TREATY DEADLINES FOR CLEARANCE

In accordance with Article 5, each state has a deadline of ten years to complete survey and clearance of mined areas upon becoming party to the APMBC. It may request one or more periods of extension of up to ten years at a time if it is unable to complete clearance in time. Table 5 summarises progress towards these deadlines. Efficient release of mined areas depends primarily on high-quality survey. In addition, each affected state that has not yet done so should conduct a national baseline survey and develop an appropriately ambitious strategic plan to release all identified areas of mine contamination.

**Table 5: Progress in implementing Article 5 of the APMBC**

State Party	Article 5 deadline	Status of progress	Priorities for action
Ecuador	31 December 2017	Extension requested	Accelerate demining to complete clearance within no more than two years
Angola	1 January 2018	Extension requested	Complete the nationwide re-survey of contamination by re-surveying the three outstanding provinces (Cabinda, Lunda Norte, and Lunda Sul), no later than 2018
Zimbabwe	1 January 2018	Extension requested	Continue to accelerate clearance with a view to completion as soon as possible but no later than 2025
Iraq	1 February 2018	Extension requested	Incorporate in its reporting contamination and clearance of all locally produced anti-personnel mines
Palau	1 May 2018	Unclear whether on target	Survey all suspected mined areas, especially in Bloody Nose Ridge in Peleliu state, as soon as possible
Thailand	1 November 2018	Extension requested	Accelerate non-technical survey and clearance to achieve its extension request land release milestones
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 March 2019	Not on track	Complete and approve swiftly its national mine action strategy for 2018–25, and reform governance and management of mine action
Croatia	1 March 2019	Not on track	Enhance use of non-technical and technical survey to improve land release efficiency

State Party	Article 5 deadline	Status of progress	Priorities for action
Serbia	1 March 2019	Not on track	Apply non-technical and technical survey to improve land release efficiency
United Kingdom	1 March 2019	Not on track	Present detailed plans for completing demining of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas as soon as possible
Sudan	1 April 2019	Not on track	Re-establish conditions that allow international demining organisations to conduct land release in Sudan
Cyprus	1 July 2019	Not on track	Cyprus and Turkey to facilitate clearance of all mined areas inside and outside the Buffer Zone
Argentina	1 January 2020	Not on track	Renew earlier offer to the United Kingdom to support demining of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands
Cambodia	1 January 2020	Not on track	Accelerate clearance of dense anti-personnel mined areas and only clear land with firm evidence of contamination
Chad	1 January 2020	Not on track	Complete national non-technical survey as soon as possible
Eritrea	1 February 2020	Not on track	Report on progress in demining as required by the APMBC and respect duty to clear mined areas as soon as possible
Chile	1 March 2020	On track	Continue to accelerate clearance in order to meet deadline
Yemen	1 March 2020	Not on track	Yemen should give access to international demining operators to increase technical expertise and capacity and accelerate clearance
Tajikistan	1 April 2020	Not on track	Complete non-technical survey of all mined areas and draft strategic plan aiming for full clearance as soon as possible
Ethiopia	1 June 2020	Not on track	Submit an updated workplan and respect duty to clear mined areas as soon as possible
Niger	31 December 2020	Unclear whether on track	Submit a detailed workplan and accelerate demining to complete clearance within no more than two years
DR Congo	1 January 2021	On track	Submit a detailed workplan and complete clearance as soon as possible, but no later than 2021
Mauritania	1 January 2021	On track	Complete clearance of remaining mined area in early 2018 as planned
Colombia	1 March 2021	Not on target	Take advantage of peace processes to conduct national baseline survey of contamination, strengthen management and coordination of mine action
Senegal	1 March 2021	Not on track	Complete non-technical survey and clear all mined areas with firm evidence of contamination as soon as possible
South Sudan	9 July 2021	Not on track	Develop resource mobilisation strategy, including national support, and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for a national mine action programme
Turkey	1 March 2022	Not on track	Finalise the national strategic mine action plan for 2017–19 as soon as possible and move forward without further delay to clear non-border areas
Somalia	1 October 2022	Not on track	Accord greater priority and resources to mine survey and clearance

State Party	Article 5 deadline	Status of progress	Priorities for action
Afghanistan	1 March 2023	Not on track	Present revised milestones for clearance reflecting reduced donor funding and clarify implications for meeting deadline
Peru	31 December 2024	On track	Consider using mine detection dogs or other technical survey methods to speed up land release in Condor mountain range
Oman	1 February 2025	Unclear whether on target	Present plans for clearance as soon as possible
States parties without future deadline			
Cameroon	1 March 2013	Needs extension	Request extended Article 5 deadline and conduct non-technical survey in Extrême-Nord (Far North) region
Jordan	1 May 2012	Needs extension	Request extended Article 5 deadline and continue re-clearance of areas not cleared to humanitarian standards
Nigeria	1 March 2012	Needs extension	Request extended Article 5 deadline and conduct non-technical survey in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states
Mozambique	1 January 2015	Has four mined areas to release	Mozambique should release mined areas currently under water as soon as it is possible to do so
Ukraine	1 June 2016	Serious violation: needs extension	Ensure no use of anti-personnel mines by its forces and request extension to its Article 5 deadline without further delay

Several states parties appear to be in breach of their international legal obligation to clear mines “as soon as possible”, notably Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Senegal. Eritrea kicked out international demining organisations a decade ago and has failed to fill the gap left by their departure from the national mine action programme. States parties should consider initiating an Article 8 procedure to address Eritrea’s failure to respect its treaty obligations. Senegal has prevented clearance of known mined areas without justification and the failure to clear mines around military bases raises serious doubt as to Senegal’s compliance with the prohibition on use under the APMBC.

While states not party to the APMBC do not have specific clearance deadlines, their obligations under international human rights law to protect life mean that they are required to survey, mark, and clear anti-personnel mines as soon as possible.<sup>6</sup> Among states not party, Sri Lanka, formerly one of the world’s most heavily mined countries, has unilaterally set a deadline of 2020 for completion of mine clearance. In addition, the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) expects that clearance of anti-personnel mines in the province will be completed by 2021. Mine Action Review encourages all states not party and other territories to pledge to complete clearance as soon as possible but no later than 2025, as committed to in the APMBC’s Maputo +15 Declaration by states parties.

## MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

The quality of programmes for the survey and clearance of landmines varies widely among states and territories. To help affected states and their partners focus their capacity building and technical assistance efforts on areas of weakness, a performance scoring system is used by Mine Action Review. Ten areas with a particularly strong influence on the effectiveness and efficiency of a survey and clearance programme are assessed, as explained in Table 6.

A score of between 0 and 10 is accorded for each of the ten criteria and an average performance score calculated. Average scores of 8.0 or above are considered “very good”, 7.0–7.9 is ranked “good”, 5.0–6.9 is ranked “average”, 4.0–4.9 is ranked “poor”, while 0–3.9 ranks as “very poor”. The factors that determine each score are summarised in the table below.

**Table 6: Programme performance – criteria and factors**

Criterion	Key factors affecting scoring
Understanding of the problem	Has a national baseline of mine contamination been established? Has the extent of the mine threat been identified with a reasonable degree of accuracy? Does the estimate include confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) as well as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)?
Target date for completion	Is a state seeking effectively to clear all contamination from its territory? Has a date been set by the mine action centre (MAC) or national mine action authority (NMAA) for completion of clearance? Is the target date realistic based on existing capacity? Is there a strategic plan in place to meet the target date? Is it sufficiently ambitious?
Targeted clearance	Is clearance focused on confirmed contamination? Are significant areas of land being cleared that prove to have no contamination?
Efficient clearance	Are dogs integrated into demining operations (where appropriate)? Are machines integrated into demining operations (where appropriate)?
National funding of programme	Is national funding covering the cost of the MAC? Is national funding covering any survey or clearance costs? Is national funding being used efficiently? Is national funding being used in accordance with good governance principles?
Timely clearance	Are contaminated areas prioritised for clearance according to explicit criteria? Are areas of high impact dealt with swiftly? Are there delays to clearing an area for political reasons?
Land release system	Is there a coherent land release system in place for the programme? Is this system understood and used by all the operators? Is there an effectively functioning non-technical survey capacity? Is there an effectively functioning technical survey capacity?
National standards	Do national mine action standards exist? Are they consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and do they reflect international best practice? Are they adapted to the local threat and context? How well are they applied?
Reporting on progress	Does the state submit regular Article 7 transparency reports on progress in fulfilling its Article 5 clearance obligations? Does it report regularly and meaningfully to donors and civil society? Do these reports detail progress disaggregated by the different methods of land release? Are they accurate?
Improving performance	Has the national programme, or have key parts of it, improved or deteriorated over the previous year?

Table 7 summarises programme performances for states and other areas in 2016, identifying whether the trend in performance is positive or negative compared to the previous year. Of the programmes that were given ratings in both years, 22 improved, 6 remained the same, while 17 deteriorated. States parties to the APMBC are in bold.

As in last year’s report, only one state, Algeria, attained a “very good” rating, but four programmes were rated “good”: Chile, Mauritania, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. This is three more than last year. The biggest drop was in the scoring for Ecuador’s national programme, a reflection of its failure to meet its end-2017 deadline and the decision to request a grossly excessive additional extension period. All of these states are party to the APMBC except for Sri Lanka.

Table 7: States and other areas by landmine programme performance score for 2016

State/territory	Performance score	Performance rating	Performance trend
<b>Algeria</b>	8.4	Very Good	▲
<b>Chile</b>	7.2	Good	▲
Sri Lanka	7.2	Good	▲
<b>Mauritania</b>	7.0	Good	▲
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	7.0	Good	▲
<b>Croatia</b>	6.9	Average	▼
<b>Afghanistan</b>	6.7	Average	▲
<b>United Kingdom</b>	6.4	Average	▲
<b>Cambodia</b>	6.3	Average	▼
<b>Thailand</b>	6.3	Average	▼
Israel	6.2	Average	▲
<b>Jordan</b>	6.1	Average	▲
<b>Mozambique</b>	6.1	Average	▲
<b>Angola</b>	6.0	Average	▲
<b>South Sudan</b>	6.0	Average	▲
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	5.9	Average	◀▶
<b>Colombia</b>	5.8	Average	▼
<b>Cyprus</b>	5.8	Average	◀▶
<b>Niger</b>	5.8	Average	▼
Kosovo	5.7	Average	▼
Lebanon	5.7	Average	▲
Azerbaijan	5.6	Average	▼
<b>DR Congo</b>	5.6	Average	▼
Nagorno-Karabakh	5.6	Average	◀▶
Armenia	5.5	Average	◀▶
Palestine	5.4	Average	▲
<b>Serbia</b>	5.4	Average	▼
<b>Turkey</b>	5.3	Average	▲
<b>Sudan</b>	5.2	Average	▲
<b>Tajikistan</b>	5.2	Average	▲
Western Sahara	5.2	Average	▼
<b>Chad</b>	5.2	Average	▲
<b>Ecuador</b>	4.9	Poor	▼
<b>Iraq</b>	4.8	Poor	▲
Georgia	4.7	Poor	▲
Russia	4.7	Poor	◀▶
<b>Peru</b>	4.6	Poor	▼
<b>Somalia</b>	4.5	Poor	▼
<b>Ukraine</b>	4.4	Poor	◀▶
Vietnam	4.1	Poor	▼
<b>Yemen</b>	4.0	Poor	▲
<b>Senegal</b>	3.4	Very Poor	▲
<b>Eritrea</b>	3.0	Very Poor	▼
<b>Ethiopia</b>	2.4	Very Poor	▼
Myanmar	1.4	Very Poor	▼

Of the states with the worst programme performance ratings in 2016, a disappointing number are states parties to the APMBC. Ethiopia, a state party, has gone from being one of the best mine action programmes a decade ago to being one of the worst. The problems are all of their own making. The same is true for Eritrea, which has failed to even report on progress in demining, while Senegal has very little progress on which to report. Yemen's ongoing conflict has clearly affected

its demining programme, but at least it showed signs of improvement in 2016 amid the continuing conflicts raging across its territory. Myanmar, a state not party, was by some distance the lowest ranked programme, with the government's continued refusal to allow mine clearance preventing a peace dividend from being realised, and new mine-laying amounting to a serious violation of international human rights law.

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## REPORTING ON SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It continues to be unacceptable how poorly states report on their efforts to tackle landmine contamination. Too many are either unable or unwilling to provide simple and accurate reports on the extent of contamination and progress in survey and clearance.

For states parties to the APMBC, detailed reporting is a legal obligation. Under Article 7, each affected state party is required to report annually on:

- To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced
- The status of programmes for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5, and
- The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after becoming a state party to the APMBC, including a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed.<sup>7</sup>

Failure to comply with this reporting obligation is a violation of the APMBC. As at September 2017, the following states parties had not submitted Article 7 reports for 2016, and in some cases previous calendar years too: Angola, Cameroon, DR Congo, Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Mine Action Review has a set of reporting templates that it provides to affected states to ensure reporting in accordance with good practice, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). They cover contamination, survey, and clearance, as set out in Annex 2. In particular,

the tables for survey and clearance set out the data the national mine action centre should require operators to report on a monthly basis, and which all states should be able to present.

The most common problems Mine Action Review has encountered in reports by states and operators are:

- An inability or refusal to distinguish mine clearance from battle area clearance.
- Lack of understanding of what a suspected hazardous area (SHA) is, particularly when compared to a confirmed hazardous area (CHA), and a corresponding failure to distinguish between the two forms of mined area in reporting
- An inability to report on technical survey distinct from full clearance
- Reporting on anti-personnel mines, particularly locally produced mines, as improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
- Reporting as "land release" an initial survey of a large, previously unsurveyed area (even a district) that may contain contamination but which in fact does not, and
- Failure to disaggregate reported data by the amount of land cancelled by non-technical survey, reduced by technical survey, and released by clearance.

These skew reporting and give a false impression of efficiency, and in some instances are not in compliance with state party reporting obligations under the APMBC. In many cases, they are also evidence of poor land release practices in the field.

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1 According to Article 2(2) of the APMBC, a mine is "a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle." As is clear from the *travaux préparatoires* of the Convention, it does not matter whether the mine is factory-produced or artisanal, or whether it is adapted from another munition.

2 According to Article 2(1) of the APMBC, "'Anti-personnel mine' means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped." According to Article 2(3) of the APMBC, "'Anti-handling device' means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

3 IMAS 01:10, Second Edition (as amended as at June 2013), §6.2.

4 See N. Melzer, *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law*, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, 2009, Part II, s. V, esp. p. 48ff.

5 See *The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict*, Geneva, 2009, Rule 24.

6 For instance, in the case of *Albekov v. Russia*, which concerned the failure to clear landmines, the European Court of Human Rights held that "having regard to the State's failure to endeavour to locate and deactivate the mines, to mark and seal off the mined area so as to prevent anybody from freely entering it, and to provide the villagers with comprehensive warnings concerning the mines laid in the vicinity of their village, the Court finds that the State has failed to comply with its positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to protect [life]." European Court of Human Rights, *Albekov and Others v. Russia*, Judgment (Final), 6 April 2009, §90. See also *Pasa and Erkan Erol v. Turkey*, Judgment, 12 December 2006. At the time, Russia was not (and is still not) a party to the APMBC.

7 Art. 7(1), (g), APMBC.





# MYANMAR

<b>MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE</b>	For 2016	For 2015
<b>Problem understood</b>	2	4
<b>Target date for completion of mine clearance</b>	1	1
<b>Targeted clearance</b>	1	0
<b>Efficient clearance</b>	1	0
<b>National funding of programme</b>	1	1
<b>Timely clearance</b>	1	0
<b>Land release system in place</b>	2	4
<b>National mine action standards</b>	3	3
<b>Reporting on progress</b>	1	1
<b>Improving performance</b>	1	4
<b>PERFORMANCE SCORE: VERY POOR</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.8</b>

## PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Myanmar has still not taken steps to create a functioning national mine action programme. It authorised the first non-technical survey in 2016, but does not permit marking of hazardous areas or clearance.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Myanmar should accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) as a matter of priority.
- The Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) should stop all use of mines.
- Myanmar should appoint a government focal point of contact for mine action as a first step to creating a fully-fledged mine action authority and preparing a strategic plan.
- Myanmar should adopt mine action standards.
- Myanmar should expand non-technical survey of hazardous areas and permit marking and clearance.

## CONTAMINATION

Myanmar is heavily mine-affected as a result of conflicts between the Tatmadaw and numerous non-state armed groups affiliated with ethnic minorities which started after independence in 1948. Mined areas are located in areas of Myanmar adjacent to borders with Bangladesh, China, and Thailand, but are a particular threat in northern and eastern parts of the country.

Some 55 townships (out of a total of 325) in 10 states and regions are believed to suffer from some degree of mine contamination, primarily from anti-personnel mines.<sup>1</sup> Karen (Kayin) state and Pegu (Bago) division are among those with the heaviest mine contamination and the highest number of recorded victims. Townships on the Indian border of Chin state and in the Sagaing region also reportedly have suspected hazardous areas.<sup>2</sup>

Additional mine use occurred in 2017 when the Tatmadaw reportedly planted anti-personnel mines on the border between northern Rakhine State and Bangladesh and during a military campaign in August and September.<sup>3</sup>

No estimate exists of the extent of contamination but suspected hazardous areas have been reported in the following states and townships:

- Kayah state: all seven townships
- Kayin state: all seven townships
- Kachin state: Chipwi, Hpakant, Mansi, Mogaung, Momauk, Myitkyina, Tsawlaw, and Waingmaw
- Mon state: Bilin, Kyaikto, Mawlamyine, Thanbyuzayat, Thaton, and Ye
- Bago region: Kyaukkyi, Shwekyin, Tantabin, and Taungoo
- Rakhine state: Maungdaw
- Shan state: Hopong, Hsenwi, Hsihseng, Konkyan, Kyaukme, Langkho, Loilen, Mawkmai, Mongpan, Mongton, Monghpyak, Namhsan Tachileik, Namtu, Nanhkan, Yaksawk, and Ywangan
- Tanintharyi region: Bokpyin, Dawei, Tanintharyi, Thayetchaung, and Yebyu
- Chin state and Sagaing region.

Myanmar's Mine Risks Working Group (MRWG) recorded 161 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in 2016: 41 killed and 120 injured. Half these casualties (20 dead, 79 injured) occurred in Shan State and another 55 casualties (18 dead, 37 injured) in Kachin State.<sup>4</sup>

## PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The government set up a Myanmar Mine Action Centre (MMAC) under the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in 2013 but the centre was never fully staffed. The MPC was dissolved at the end of March 2016 and replaced by a National Reconciliation and Peace Centre which reports to the head of government. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, however, said concluding a National Ceasefire Agreement with non-state actors was a precondition for proceeding to survey and clearance and would be her administration's priority.<sup>5</sup> The government formed since March 2016 under her leadership had not, as at September 2017, formulated a clear direction for mine action or established a centre to coordinate it.<sup>6</sup>

The Department of Social Work leads the MRWG, co-chaired with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), which comprises 10 ministries and 41

international and national organisations. The group meets quarterly and focuses on risk education and victim assistance. In the process it has overseen the first steps to systematic survey of mine contamination.

### Operators

International demining organisations, including DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), have offices in Yangon and some provincial centres and through community liaison or risk education have been able to build up knowledge of the location of hazardous areas in some states.

## LAND RELEASE

Operators have not received authorisation to conduct marking or clearance from either the government or ethnic minority authorities but the Department of Social Work approved full non-technical survey in specified government-controlled areas for the first time in 2016.

MAG, after two years of risk education and community safety mapping in Kayah State, received authorisation from the Department of Social Work for a pilot survey in government-controlled areas, which it conducted between July and October 2016 focusing on 16 villages of Loikaw township. Teams surveyed 30 of 47 hazardous areas covering 44,828m<sup>2</sup> identifying contamination by anti-personnel mines and ERW. In December, the Department authorised MAG to conduct non-technical survey in 74 villages across 6 townships. By the end of June 2017, MAG had surveyed 78 hazardous areas covering 77,782m<sup>2</sup>. MAG found mines particularly in the vicinity of electricity pylons, even those outside conflict areas, underscoring the importance of investigating areas around other key infrastructure.<sup>7</sup>

In 2017, MAG had five community liaison teams working full-time on non-technical survey in all seven of Kayah state's townships. It had four survey teams in Shan state working out of Taunggyi and conducting full non-technical survey in three townships and community mapping in two others. It also had two teams undertaking initial

community surveys in Kayin State as well as working with a local partner doing similar baseline surveys in non-government controlled areas, and three teams in the southern Tanintharyi region.<sup>8</sup>

The HALO Trust had conducted risk education under an MoU with the Department of Social Work authorising it to work in all seven townships of Kayin state and some townships of Bago, Mon, Kachin, and Shan states. In 2016, it opened offices in Hpa-An in Kayin state, and in Lashio in northern Shan state. The MoU was amended in July 2017 expanding the approved operating area to include 18 townships of Shan state and authorising it to conduct non-technical survey. The HALO Trust was working in three townships of Kayin state (Hlaingbwe, Hpa-An, and Thandaungyi) and deployed three survey teams to map polygons. It planned to convert risk education teams to survey and to increase the number of survey teams to between six and eight. In Shan state, HALO Trust was conducting risk education and waiting for funding to begin non-technical survey.<sup>9</sup>

DDG, which has six teams conducting risk education in Kachin, northern Shan, and Kayah states also received Department of Social Work authorisation to undertake non-technical survey in Kayah state's Demoso township where it deployed two teams with three surveyors each starting in May 2017.<sup>10</sup>

## ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Myanmar is not a state party to the APMBC. However, it has obligations under customary international human rights law, particularly by virtue of its duty to protect life, to clear anti-personnel mines as soon as possible.

- 1 Myanmar is divided into states and regions. States are the "home area" of ethnic groups. Other areas, which are not identified with a specific ethnic group, are administrative regions. The former military junta changed the name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 and also changed the names of some states. Many ethnic groups within the country still prefer to use the name Burma. Internal state and division names are given in their common form or with the name adopted by the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in parentheses.
- 2 Research by Landmine Monitor. Data sources included casualty information, sightings of mine warnings, and reports by NGOs and other organisations of use, as well as interviews with field staff and armed forces personnel. The survey included casualty data from January 2007 through September 2015 and data from other informants from January 2008 through September 2015.
- 3 Amnesty International, "Myanmar Army landmines along border with Bangladesh pose deadly threat to fleeing Rohingya", 9 September 2017; Human Rights Watch, "Burma: Landmines Deadly for Fleeing Rohingya", 23 September 2017.
- 4 "Strategic Workplan 2017", Mine Risks Working Group, undated but 2017, p. 16.
- 5 Roger Fasth and Pascal Simon, "Mine Action in Myanmar", *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 19.2, July 2015.
- 6 Interviews with Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Country Director, NPA; Greg Crowther, Regional Director, South and South East Asia, MAG, in Phnom Penh, 1 May 2017; and email from Melissa Andersson, Programme Manager, NPA, Yangon, 27 September 2017.
- 7 Interview with Greg Crowther, MAG, Phnom Penh 1 May 2017; "Preliminary results of MAG's Non-Technical Survey in Kayah State," received by email from Greg Crowther, MAG, 2 May 2017; Greg Crowther, Josephine Dresner, and Michael Aaron, "Mine Action in Burma, Building Trust and Incremental Gains", *Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction*, Center for International Stabilization and Recovery, James Madison University, United States, Issue 21.2, July 2017.
- 8 Email from Bekim Shala, Country Director, MAG, 27 September 2017.
- 9 Email from Samuel Fricker, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 25 September 2017.
- 10 Email from Pascal Simon, Programme Manager, DDG, 28 September 2017; Danish Refugee Council/DDG, "Deployment and activities in Myanmar," July 2017.



HALO Trust deminers carefully search for landmines, during clearance operations on a hillside in Afghanistan, 2017 © HALO Trust

# ANNEXES

The background of the page is composed of several overlapping, semi-transparent geometric shapes in various shades of teal and light teal. These shapes create a layered, abstract effect. The word 'ANNEXES' is printed in a bold, white, sans-serif font in the upper left corner.

# ANNEX 1: ARTICLE 5 OF THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

## ARTICLE 5: DESTRUCTION OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN MINED AREAS

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
  - a) The duration of the proposed extension;
  - b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
    - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programmes;
    - (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
    - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
  - c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
  - d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

## ANNEX 2: REPORTING TEMPLATES

Annex 2 provides templates for reporting accurately and meaningfully on landmine contamination and identification and release of land confirmed or suspected to contain mines.

**Table 1: Mine contamination by province (as at end [2016])**

Province/Region	No. of CHAs with mines	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	No. of SHAs with mines	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )
<b>Totals</b>				

CHAs = Confirmed hazardous areas    SHAs = Suspected hazardous areas

**Table 2: Non-technical survey in [2016]**

Operator	No. of SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m <sup>2</sup> )	No. of SHAs confirmed as mined	Area confirmed (m <sup>2</sup> )
<b>Totals</b>				

**Table 3: Technical survey of mined area in [2016]**

Operator	Area covered (km <sup>2</sup> )	No. of CHAs identified	Area confirmed (km <sup>2</sup> )	Area reduced (km <sup>2</sup> )
<b>Totals</b>				

**Table 4: Clearance of mined areas in [2016]**

Operator	No. of areas cleared	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
<b>Totals</b>					

AP = Anti-personnel

AV = Anti-vehicle

UXO = Unexploded ordnance

# GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AP mine</b>	Anti-personnel mine	<b>MAG</b>	Mines Advisory Group
<b>APMBC</b>	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	<b>MAPA</b>	Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan
<b>AV mine</b>	Anti-vehicle mine	<b>MAT</b>	Mine Action Team
<b>AXO</b>	Abandoned explosive ordnance	<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>BAC</b>	Battle area clearance	<b>MTT</b>	Multi-Task Team
<b>CCM</b>	Convention on Cluster Munitions	<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>CHA</b>	Confirmed hazardous area	<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>CMR</b>	Cluster munition remnants	<b>NMAA</b>	National Mine Action Authority
<b>DDG</b>	Danish Demining Group	<b>NMAS</b>	National Mine Action Standards
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo	<b>NPA</b>	Norwegian People's Aid
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive ordnance disposal	<b>NTS</b>	Non-technical survey
<b>ERW</b>	Explosive remnants of war	<b>QA</b>	Quality assurance
<b>EU</b>	European Union	<b>QC</b>	Quality control
<b>FSD</b>	Swiss Foundation for Mine Action	<b>SHA</b>	Suspected hazardous area
<b>HALO</b>	The HALO Trust	<b>TS</b>	Technical survey
<b>HI</b>	Handicap International	<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>ICC</b>	Integrated Clearance Capacity (team)	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>IED</b>	Improvised explosive device	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>IMAS</b>	International Mine Action Standards	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>IMSMA</b>	Information Management System for Mine Action	<b>UNMAS</b>	United Nations Mine Action Service
<b>Lao PDR</b>	Lao People's Democratic Republic	<b>US</b>	United States
<b>MAC</b>	Mine action centre	<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded ordnance
<b>MACCA</b>	Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan		



An NPA dog handler and his mine detection dog conduct technical survey in Bratunac municipality, in the Srebrenica region of eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 2017. © Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)



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**Norwegian People's Aid**

Norwegian People's Aid  
PO Box 8844 Youngstorget  
N-0028 Oslo, Norway

Telephone: **+ 47 2203 7700**  
Email: [npaid@npaid.org](mailto:npaid@npaid.org)

**[www.npaid.org](http://www.npaid.org)**